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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. JURISDICTION
A. South Carolina Long-Arm Statute
Thompson v. Hofmann' was another in a long line of cases
dealing with South Carolina's often beleaguered 2 long-arm stat-
ute.' The defendant in Thompson was served under section 10.2-
806(1)(c)4 which provides for out-of-state service of process on
nonresidents in certain specified cases. Mrs. Thompson, the
plaintiff, brought suit against Carol Hofmann, a resident of New
Jersey, charging that Hofmann committed certain tortious acts
in South Carolina which resulted in the alienation of affections
between the plaintiff and her husband. Hofmann appeared spe-
cially to challenge the court's jurisdiction and contended that in
personam jurisdiction based on the long-arm statute5 was viola-
tive of the South Carolina constitution which provides that
"[e]very Act or resolution having the force of law shall relate to
but one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."6
The majority of the court, Justices Moss and Littlejohn dis-
senting, held that the 1972 reenactment of the long-arm statute7
was not in conflict with the constitution. Hofmann had con-
tended that the 1972 Act pertained to two subjects, and therefore,
1. 263 S.C. 314, 210 S.E.2d 461 (1974).
2. See Practice and Procedure, 1974 Survey of S.C. Law, 26 S.C.L. REv. 288 (1974),
for cases involving the South Carolina long-arm statute.
3. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 10.2-801 to -809 (Spec. Supp. 1966); enacted as No. 1065,
[1966] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 4027, reenacted as No. 1343, [1972] S.C. Acts. & Jt. Res.
2518. The provisions of the long-arm statute are taken from the Uniform Interstate and
International Procedure Act.
4. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-806(1)(c) (Spec. Supp. 1966) provides:
(1) When the law of this State authorizes service outside this State, the service
when reasonably calculated to give actual notice, may be made:
(c) by any form of mail addressed to the person to be served and requiring
a signed receipt.
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-803(1)(c) (Spec. Supp. 1966), as reenacted in 1972, pro-
vides:
(1) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly
or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the person's
(c) commission of a tortious act in whole or in part in this state . . ..
6. S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 17.
7. For cases declaring parts of the original long-arm statute unconstitutional, see 24
S.C.L. REv. 474 (1972).
1
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was unconstitutional. Defendant argued that the title to the 1972
reenactment provided for two different subjects-a reenactment
of the Uniform Commercial Code and a provision for personal
jurisdiction and out-of-state service in actions which were unre-
lated to any commercial transactions covered by the UCC. Defen-
dant found evidence of this supposed constitutional infirmity in
the wording of the title to the 1972 reenactment of the long-arm
statute:
An Act to reenact Part 8 of Article 2 of Act 1065 of 1966, relating
to the Uniform Commercial Code, so as to make the provisions
of Part 8 which relates to certain definitions, personal jurisdic-
tion based upon enduring relationship, personal jurisdiction
based upon conduct, provision for service outside the State and
to state that other bases of jurisdiction shall be unaffected, to
establish a manner and proof of service, to establish individuals
eligible to make service, to establish individuals to be served
and to provide that other provisions shall remain unaffected.8
The majority gave little credence to the defendant's conten-
tion. When the constitutionality of an act is questioned
every presumption will be indulged in favor of the constitution-
ality of a legislative enactment, which will be declared unconsti-
tutional only when its invalidity appears so clearly as to leave
no room for reasonable doubt as to its conflict with the
Constitution. . . .It is also axiomatic that a statute will, if
possible, be construed in a manner conforming to constitutional
limitations.'
The court felt that reenactment of the long-arm statute was a
"complete remedial statute of substantial benefit"1 and that the
title to a statute is no ground upon which to overturn its constitu-
tionality. The majority justified its view by noting that reference
to the 1966 Act (UCC) in the title to the 1972 reenactment "adds
nothing to the substantive provisions of the legislation [and]
.. .[i]f necessary .. .should be disregarded as surplusage."'"
The court also characterized defendant's attack on the constitu-
tionality of the 1972 Act as one in "form only... [which] lacks
8. No. 1343, [1972] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 2518.
9. 263 S.C. at 319, 210 S.E.2d at 463.
10. Id.
11. Id.
19751
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sufficient substance to justify our striking it down as unconstitu-
tional.""
Justices Moss and Littlejohn, in a strong dissent, reasoned
that inclusion of the long-arm provisions within the South Caro-
lina version of the Uniform Commercial Code violated the state
constitution. The dissenters based their opinion on the official
title to the entire UCC as enacted in 1966:
An Act to be known as the Uniform Commercial Code, Relating
to Certain Commercial Transactions in or regarding Personal
Property and Contracts and other Documents concerning them,
including Sales, Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and Collec-
tions, Letters of Credit, Bulk Transfers, Warehouse Receipts,
Bills of Lading, other Documents of Title, Investment Securi-
ties, and Secured Transactions, including certain Sales of Ac-
counts, Chattel Paper, and Contract Rights; Providing for Pub-
lic Notice to Third Parties in Certain Circumstances; Regulat-
ing Procedure, Evidence and Damages in certain Court Actions
Involving such Transactions, Contracts or Documents; to Make
Uniform the Law with Respect Thereto; and Repealing Incon-
sistent Legislation. 3
According to the dissent, the title does not mention tort claims.
By looking at the title to the Act, no notice of any long-arm
provisions allowing courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants in tort actions is discernible. Such lack
of notice is "the very evil that the framers of our Constitution
were attempting to avoid:"14
[To prevent the General Assembly from being misled into the
passage of bills containing provisions not indicated in their ti-
tles, and to apprise the people of the subject of proposed legisla-
tion and thus give them opportunity to be heard if they so de-
sire. Accordingly, while it is to be construed with great liberality
so as not to embarrass or obstruct needed legislation, liberality
of construction should not be extended to such a point as to
foster the abuses which its provisions are designed to prevent.
5
To further this purpose, the dissent felt that the state consti-
tution required all provisions of a proposed act to relate to and
12. Id.
13. No. 1065, [1966] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 4027.
14. 263 S.C. at 322, 210 S.E.2d at 465 (Moss, C.J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 325.26, 210 S.E.2d at 466, citing Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Tax
Comm'n, 233 S.C. 129, 103 S.E.2d 908 (1958).
[Vol. 27
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deal with a single subject. Consequently, the dissent found the
reenactment of the long-arm statute to be constitutionally defec-
tive.
When the General Assembly enacted the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, it "declared that 'commercial transactions' are a single
subject of the law and that the act would afford for the first time,
integrated coverage regarding the many aspects of commercial
transactions." 6 The dissent reasoned that since reenactment of
the long-arm statute is in no way connected with "commercial
transactions," it could not be considered constitutionally effec-
tive:
The cited section is effective so long as it has a legitimate and
natural association with a commercial transaction, which was
the subject of the original act. However, this section could not
be applied to tortious conduct which was wholly unrelated to a
commercial transaction, because such application would have
no natural association with the single general subject embraced
in the title and therefore would be violative of Article H, Sec-
tion 17 of the Constitution. Assuming that Act No. 1343 effec-
tively changed the title to Act No. 1065 to include jurisdiction
of nonresidents in tort actions unrelated to commercial transac-
tions, the title to the act then would contain two subjects, and
this would be violative of Article III, Section 17 of the Constitu-
tion."
Unquestionably, an effective long-arm statute should be sep-
arate from the Uniform Commercial Code. If it is contained in the
UCC or any other unrelated legislative enactment, it would be
found to be constitutionally defective according to the rationale
of the dissent. This problem would seem to be easily overcome if
the General Assembly would transfer the reenacted long-arm
statute from the UCC to the jurisdictional or procedural provi-
sions of the Code. The problem is a legislative one; legislative
inaction can rarely be cured by judicial interpretation. The ma-
jority position in Thompson is pragmatically sound and avoids
overturning a long-arm statute that presumably meets due pro-
cess requirements of "fair play and substantial justice.""8 Al-
though the dissent's position may be technically correct, a statute
which complies with the requirements of the due process clause
16. No. 1065, [1966] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 4027.
17. 263 S.C. at 327, 210 S.E.2d at 467 (Moss, C.J., dissenting).
18. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
1975]
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of the fourteenth amendment should be upheld by the courts
until the legislature corrects any infirmities which may exist
under the South Carolina constitution.
In the concluding paragraph of its decision in Thompson, the
South Carolina Supreme Court, citing weighty authority"0 after
a curious legal analysis,"0 held that the 1972 reenactment of the
long-arm statute2 was retrospective and applied "in actions
commenced after the passage of the statute regardless of when the
cause of action may have arisen. '22 Although the cause of action
in Thompson arose in 1969, the court allowed the defendant to
be served under the revised long-arm statute even though the suit
was not commenced until after the 1972 reenactment.
The broad sweep of the supreme court's holding in
Thompson would seem to be clearly wrong. This error is under-
scored in a recent unpublished opinion of the district court which
arrived at an opposite conclusion. In Hardy v. Pioneer Parachute
Co., 2 filed prior to the Thompson decision, the district court held
that the long-arm statute should not be applied retroactively.
Although this conclusion was dictum, and obviously not binding
on South Carolina courts, the district court's opinion in Hardy
merits some analysis. 4
19. Annot. 19 A.L.R.3d 138, 146 (1968); 62 AM. JuR. 2d, Process, § 80 (1972):
With respect to the question whether a long-arm statute is applicable even
though the act or transaction on which jurisdiction is predicated occurred prior
to its effective date, a distinction has been made between statutes which provide
by their terms merely that the acts or transactions specified therein shall be the
basis of the jurisdiction of local courts over, or extraterritorial service on, non-
residents, and those enactments, often called "implied consent" statutes, which
by their terms provide that such acts or transactions are deemed to be the
consent of the non-resident to the appointment of a local officer as agent for the
purpose of service of process. The general rule that in the absence of a statutory
provision to the contrary, statutes pertaining to procedure operate retrospec-
tively, has been applied to the kind of long-arm statutes first described. Under
this view the retroactive application of such a statute is not precluded by the
fact that the act or transaction upon which jurisdiction is predicated occurred
prior to the effective date of the statute. On the other hand, "implied consent"
statutes have generally been held not to operate retroactively so as to extend to
acts or transactions occurring prior to the effective date of the statute.
20. The court distinguished Johnson v. Baldwin, 214 S.C. 545, 53 S.E.2d 785 (1949),
on the grounds that Johnson, unlike the present case, involved an "implied consent"
statute. See note 26 infra, and accompanying text.
21. See note 5 supra.
22. 263 S.C. at 320, 210 S.E.2d at 463.
23. Civil Action No. 73-255 filed April 26, 1974.
24. The district court recognized that its reasoning was in conflict with the decision
in Howard v. Allen, 368 F. Supp. 310 (D.S.C. 1973), but found it unnecessary to decide
5
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The Hardy court felt that "an act will not be given retrospec-
tive effect in the absence of a very clear intention to do so.",, It
relied on Johnson v. Baldwin"6 in stating its finding of the general
rule in South Carolina:
The rule is well established in this State that a statute will not
be construed so as to have retrospective effect unless such a
construction is required by the express words of the statute or
must necessarily be implied from the language used ....
Appellant asserts that this statute is remedial in character and
not subject to the rule of construction just mentioned. It is true
that a different rule applies to remedial statutes or statutes
relating to modes of procedure unless the effect is to disturb
vested rights or impair the obligation of contracts. But if con-
strued as retrospective, the Act substantially affects the rights
of respondents. The effect would be to confer upon appellant the
right to acquire jurisdiction in this State of respondents by sub-
stituted service when no such right existed during the period
when respondents served as directors and the transactions oc-
curred out of which this cause of action arose.Y
The Hardy court reasoned that the remedial or procedural excep-
tion to the retrospective application of statutes should not be
applicable to the 1972 reenactment because of the express word-
ing of the introduction to the South Carolina version of the Uni-
form Commercial Code: "This Act shall become effective at 12:01
A.M., January 1, 1968. It applies to transactions entered into and
events occurring after that date. ' 2 The court interpreted this
section as evidencing "a clear mandate that the statute is in-
tended to be prospective only in its application.""'
the issue to the contrary because the defendant in Hardy did not meet the "minimal
contacts" test of § 10.2-803. Therefore, the court would not have jurisdiction over the
defendant even if the statute could have been applied retrospectively. The court also
distinguished Segars v. Gomez, 360 F. Supp. 50 (D.S.C. 1972), on the grounds that the
Segars cause of action occurred in 1971 prior to the 1972 reenactment, but after the 1968
enactment of the long-arm statute, while the Hardy cause of action arose prior to the
passage of any such long-arm statute at all.
25. Civil Action No. 73-255 at 4 (emphasis added).
26. 214 S.C. 545, 53 S.E.2d 785 (1949). In Johnson, the court refused to allow a statute
providing for service upon a nonresident director of a domestic corporation to be retrospec-
tively effective. See note 20 supra.
27. Civil Action No. 73-255 at 5 (emphasis added).
28. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10.10-101 (Spec. Supp. 1966) (emphasis added); see No. 1065,
[1966] S.C. Jt. Acts & Res. 428.
29. Civil Action No. 73-255 at 6.
1975]
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The factual situation in Hardy lends additional credence to
the court's decision. The plaintiffs cause of action arose in 1967,
prior to the passage of any long-arm statute in South Carolina.
If the court were to give retrospective effect to the 1972 reenact-
ment, it would be conferring a right upon the plaintiff which was
not in existence at the time the cause of action arose. In its deci-
sion, the district court did not hold that the 1972 long-arm statute
could never be retrospective in a manner which created rights in
parties prior to the enactment of any type of long-arm statute."
The South Carolina Supreme Court, by using the Hardy court's
reasoning, could have reached a similar result in Thompson. The
cause of action in Thompson arose in 1969, one year after enact-
ment of a long-arm statute in the 1968 Uniform Commercial
Code. The 1972 reenactment of the long-arm statute, therefore,
could be applied since one would not be creating rights not in
existence when the cause of action arose. If no new rights were
created, then the remedial exception to the general rule of pro-
spective operation of statutes would enable the 1972 reenactment
to apply retrospectively. The Thompson holding, however, is not
judicially prudent; it would allow for the potential assertion of
nonexistent rights by applying blanket retrospection and by dis-
regarding the time in which the cause of action arose.
Bass v. Harbor Light Marina, Inc.31 dealt with another provi-
sion of the 1972 reenactment of the long-arm statute. In Bass the
defendant corporation moved to quash under Federal Rule
12(b) (5) for insufficiency of service of process and under rule
12(b)(2) for lack of jurisdiction over the person because defendant
corporation was not "doing business" in South Carolina. The
district court denied both motions and held that service on the
defendant was effective and that the court possessed personal
jurisdiction. The court found that the defendant, a Georgia corpo-
ration, was "doing business" in South Carolina as defined by
Section 10.2-803(1) of the South Carolina Code, 2 relying on the
30. As a matter of fact, the same district court held the reenactment of the long-arm
statute to be retrospective in another unreported decision, South Carolina Elec. & Gas
Co. v. Sumitomo Shoji American, Inc., Civil Action No. 74-818 filed December 24, 1974.
The court based its decision on the Hofmann opinion.
31. 372 F. Supp. 786 (D.S.C. 1974).
32. The concept of "doing business" in South Carolina is defined by S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 10.2-803(1) (Cum. Supp. 1972);
Personal jurisdiction based upon conduct. (1) A court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent as to a cause of action
[Vol. 27
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recent decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Triplett
v. R.M. Wade & Co. 3 The defendant corporation qualified under
Section 10.2-803(1) because of certain "minimal contacts"34
within the forum state prior to the time of the suit. The court
decided that the cumulative effect of the defendant's activities in
South Carolina clearly met the test of "minimal contacts"
thereby enabling the court to acquire jurisdiction over the defen-
dant.3 5 The court stated:
Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice would be
offended if a foreign corporation is allowed to entice residents
of a state across the border to enter into contracts governed by
foreign law and thereafter avoid liability for any breaches aris-
ing therefrom when presented to a forum in this State.
36
The court also denied a summary judgment motion on the
part of the defendant corporation. The defendant contended that
arising from the person's
(a) transacting any business in this State;
(b) contracting to supply services or things in the State;
(g) entry into a contract to be performed in whole or in part by either party
in this State; or
(h) production, manufacture, or distribution of goods with the reasonable
expectation that those goods are to be used or consumed in this State and are
so used or consumed.
See also Engineered Prods. v. Cleveland Crane & Eng'r, 262 S.C. 1, 201 S.E.2d 921 (1974),
for a further analysis of § 10.2-803(1)(a) & (g).
33. 261 S.C. 419, 200 S.E.2d 375 (1973).
34. Such minimum contacts are required by Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958),
in order to satisfy the requirements of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
35. The activities which constituted "minimal contacts" in Bass were as follows:
(1) The defendant's corporate predecessor had exhibited its boats and accesso-
ries in boat shows in South Carolina.
(2) Defendant's employees often crossed into South Carolina while testing and
demonstrating boats on Lake Hartwell.
(3) Defendant's employees often crossed into South Carolina to perform serv-
ices on boats docked there.
(4) Defendant maintained telephone listings in two different areas of South
Carolina.
(5) The defendant regularly advertised its business in South Carolina newspa-
pers.
(6) Defendant regularly sent magazines for advertising purposes to its former
South Carolina customers.
(7) The defendant sold boats to purchasers who would use them on both the
South Carolina and Georgia sides of Lake Hartwell and the Savannah River.
36. 372 F. Supp. at 792.
8
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [1975], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss3/5
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
any liability the court may have found would necessarily be im-
posed on a predecessor corporation and, therefore, the plaintiff
was suing the wrong party. After finding that there were genuine
issues of fact as to the existence of liability, the court noted that
such a motion based on misjoinder of parties was improper under
rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.37 It continued by
recommending a future course of action for both parties "in the
interest of conserving future judicial time."" The court felt "com-
pelled to suggest to lawyers in a lawsuit how to proceed, especially
where sloppy pleading is evidenced by one or both sides."39 This
action was taken in response to the recent decision in Burris v.
State Department of Public Welfare of South Carolina," where
the Fourth Circuit stated:
Without expressing or implying any opinion whatsoever as to
the merits of plaintiff's complaint, the court is of the opinion
that the District Court Judge should have apprised plaintiff's
counsel of the availability of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §
1343, and assuming that the complaint is amended to come
within these statutes, the District Court should accept jurisdic-
tion and consider the merits of the case.
41
The Bass decision is well within the outer limits of "minimal
contacts" that the Triplett decision established.4 2 Interestingly,
the Bass court interpreted Burris to mean that it would be the
task of district courts to correct and refine any pleading mistakes
which the parties to the suit may make, even to the point of
suggesting a basis for jurisdiction. Consequently, it would be pos-
sible under this reasoning to plead in such a manner as to force
the district court to correct the pleadings and assume the task of
thinking for both parties. Since attorneys could draft their plead-
ings with the knowledge that the district court would correct any
mistakes in the interest of conserving future judicial time, more
"sloppy pleading" could result thereby placing a greater adminis-
37. FED. R. Civ. P. 21 governs misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties: "Misjoinder of
parties is not ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added by order
of the court on motion of any party or of its own initiative at any stage of the action and
on such terms as are just."
38. 372 F. Supp. at 793.
39. Id.
40. 491 F.2d 762 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).
41. Id. at 763 (emphasis added).
42. In Triplett, the court upheld jurisdiction even though the defendant corporation
had no agents or property in South Carolina.
[Vol. 27
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trative burden on district courts at a time when crowded
calendars are prevalent.
B. Diversity
Estate administrators have traditionally been viewed as the
real party in interest whose citizenship is determinative in diver-
sity jurisdiction. In a recent wrongful death action, Bishop v.
Hendricks," the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a lower
court decision that the citizenship of the beneficiaries, not the
administrator, should control in ascertaining the existence of fed-
eral diversity jurisdiction. The decedent, a citizen of South Caro-
lina, was killed in an automobile collision in Newberry County
allegedly through the negligence of the defendant, another citizen
of South Carolina. Since the decedent had died intestate, his
beneficiaries had Bishop appointed administrator of the estate by
a decree of the local probate court." Bishop, a citizen of Georgia
who was related by marriage to the beneficiaries of the estate,
thereupon commenced a wrongful death action in the federal dis-
trict court. The defendant, moving to dismiss the action for lack
of diversity, claimed that since the deceased had left no estate to
be administered, the sole reason for the appointment of an out-
of-state administrator was to provide the plaintiff with a cause
of action in the federal court. The defendant also claimed that the
action, if sucessful, would directly benefit the statutory benefici-
aries without any need for a general administration. Conse-
quently, the defendant urged the court to disregard the citizen-
ship of Bishop and to consider the citizenship of the beneficiaries
of the action as the controlling factor in the jurisdictional issue.
The district court held that the citizenship of the beneficiar-
ies was determinative of diversity. The circuit court affirmed and
refused to accept the plaintiff's contention that the rationale of
Miller v. Perry" should be limited to its particular set of facts46
43. 495 F.2d 289 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056 (1974).
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-409 (1962).
45. 456 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1972). In Miller, the court emphasized that courts should
look to the parties to determine if there is a need for a neutral forum. If this need is found
to be genuine, then federal jurisdiction should be granted.
46. In Miller, North Carolina law required that a resident administrator be appointed
to administer any in-state assets. The principal administrator, a citizen of Florida, there-
fore, was forced by statute to appoint a North Carolina ancillary administrator in order
to bring a wrongful death action on behalf of the decedent. The decedent was a citizen of
Florida and the defendants were citizens of North Carolina, and the cause of action was
19751
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since the sole motive for the appointment of an out-of-state ad-
ministrator was to manufacture federal jurisdiction. The Bishop
court concluded that
[i]n a situation where an out-of-state administrator files a
wrongful death action on behalf of resident beneficiaries, involv-
ing the death of a resident decedent in an accident occuring
within the state, want of diversity will be presumed unless the
record provides sufficient support for the conclusion that the
representation of the administrator is not nominal but was
based on a valid and substantial reason."
The Bishop decision seems to place the appointment of an
out-of-state administrator in the same "suspect category" as that
of the out-of-state third party assignee which requires the court
to delve into the factual background surrounding the appoint-
ment itself under the Supreme Court's rationale in Kramer v.
Caribbean Mills, Inc.4" The Bishop court made it clear that the
asserted reason for the appointment of an out-of-state adminis-
trator must be examined closely with regard to the statute on
collusive joinder of parties.49 The court noted that "the reason or
motive that will render the out-of-state administrator's citizen-
ship important for diversity purposes must be one that harmo-
nizes with the thrust and purposes of Section 1359 [on collusive
based on an accident which took place in North Carolina. The circuit court held that the
citizenship of the Florida beneficiaries should be controlling to ascertain federal diversity
jurisdiction under such circumstances. The court felt that the federal court would be a
better forum in which to protect the interests of the out-of-state parties. As the court
stated:
In every real sense, this is a diversity case. Had the young Floridian survived,
he clearly could have held the North Carolina defendants accountable in a
federal court. Since his beneficiaries are Floridians, the controversy is no less
interstate after his death than before.
456 F.2d at 67.
47. 495 F.2d at 293 (emphasis added), citing McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
48. 394 U.S. 823 (1969). In Kramer, one alien corporation assigned its claim against
another alien corporation to a Texas citizen. The Texas citizen agreed to return 95 percent
of any recovery to the assignor corporation. The Supreme Court held that diversity juris-
diction was defeated because the Texas citizen possessed no significant stake in the
litigation. The Court found that the assignment was solely for the purpose of achieving
diversity of citizenship in order to facilitate the collection of the sum owed under a
contract between the two alien corporations.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964) provides: "A district court shall not have jurisdiction of
a civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or
collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court."
11
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joinder] itself."5 The original purpose of the collusive joinder
statute was to deny "the use of federal courts in suits which did
not 'really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy pro-
perly within the jurisdiction' of the federal courts.
51
According to Bishop, the out-of-state administrator must
convince the court as to the substance of his appointment and
must be able to demonstrate that his status as administrator
exceeds that of a nominal party to the litigation. The answers to
several important questions are dispositive:
1. Does the administrator possess any stake in the outcome
of the litigation?"
2. Does the administrator have any power or control over
the litigation, or can the beneficiaries choose to settle the suit
without consulting him?53
3. Is the action ancillary to any other general fiduciary du-
ties of the administrator, or are there any other assets in the
estate to be managed outside of the suit itself?54
4. Does the administrator possess any special knowledge of
the accident or any special skill in the area of the suit's prosecu-
tion?55
5. Did the administrator have any duties to perform, such
as the selection of counsel, or is he only involved because of a
statutory requirement?
5
The court failed to discover the presence of any of these
determinative factors which indicate more than a nominal inter-
50. 495 F.2d at 293.
51. Id. at 294.
52. Id. at 295. In O'Brien v. Stover, 443 F.2d 1013 (8th Cir. 1971), the fact that the
administratrix was also the sole heir and daughter of the deceased allowed the court to
look to her citizenship in order to determine diversity jurisdiction. See also Davis v.
Carabo, 50 F.R.D. 468 (D.S.C. 1970).
53. 495 F.2d at 295.
54. Id. at 295-96. Very similar questions were asked in Kramer. See 394 U.S. at 827-
28.
55. 495 F.2d at 296. The court emphasized that even if the administrator is more
experienced in business affairs than the beneficiaries, this "skill" would not normally be
sufficient to elevate his status enough to look solely to his citizenship to determine diver-
sity. The plaintiff had suggested that the beneficiaries were without business experience
which Bishop possessed, thereby trying to supply a reason for choosing him to administer
the estate. The court said that business experience was "unimportant since here there
could be no occasion to use business experience in the very limited nominal role to be
played by the administrator." Id. at 296. This argument has been attempted many times
with similar results. See Panagio v. Palmer, 343 F. Supp. 940 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
56. 495 F.2d at 295-96.
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est in the action and determined that plaintiff-administrator in
Bishop was a "straw party,"5 thus his citizenship was not to be
determinative of federal diversity jurisdiction. Having no control
over the suit and having no duties of administration outside of the
litigation, the administrator was considered to have been ap-
pointed "solely for the purposes of providing a nominal plaintiff
for the maintenance of this action. His appointment is manifestly
an artificial creation of federal diversity and, as such, cannot
support jurisdiction.""8 The court looked to the citizenship of the
beneficiaries as the controlling factor and, therefore, dismissed
the case for want of jurisdiction.
By requiring that courts examine the substantiality of the
justification for the appointment of an out-of-state administrator,
the circuit court seems to have extended the Kramer rationale
beyond what the Kramer court desired. The Kramer court was
not willing to analogize the position of administrators with that
of assignees. In fact, the decision specifically distinguished the
two:
Nor is it necessary to consider whether, in cases in which suit is
required to be brought by an administrator or guardian, a mo-
tive to create diversity jurisdiction renders the appointment of
an out-of-state representative "improper" or "collusive." Cases
involving representatives vary in several respects from those in
which jurisdiction is based on assignments: (1) in the former
situation, some representative must be appointed before suit
can be brought, while in the latter the assignor normally is
himself capable of suing in state court; (2) under state law,
different kinds of guardians and administrators may possess
discrete sorts of powers; and (3) all such representatives owe
their appointment to the decree of a state court, rather than
solely to an action of the parties. It is not necessary to decide
whether these distinctions amount to a difference for purposes
of § 1359.11
It appears the Bishop court, however, did examine the out-of-
state administrator with the same intensity as it would have ex-
amined the out-of-state third party assignee to determine
whether the administrator was the real party in interest.
57. Id. at 296.
58. Id.
59. 394 U.S. at 828 n.9 (citations omitted).
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The requirement that the district court scrutinize the justifi-
cation for an appointment of an out-of-state administrator can be
seen to have two opposite results. First, it would necessitate a
great deal of procedural complication; an in-depth examination
of the administrator might be essential to the threshold question
of jurisdiction. Such an examination, probably taking place
during pretrial proceedings, could cause significant delay and
raise questions on matters substantially beyond the pleadings."
Secondly, when an examination of the pleaded parties is neces-
sary, those parties who do not need the protection of the federal
courts might be recognized and eliminated at the commencement
of the proceedings. If attorneys know that such an examination
may be forthcoming, the number of questionable or dubious out-
of-state appointments will be reduced, thereby lightening the fed-
eral caseload. As the Miller court noted, "diversity jurisdiction
exists for the protection of the noncitizen who is obliged to sue or
be sued in the state of his adversary."'" The Bishop examination
is consistent with the historical basis for diversity jurisdiction and
should lead to a marked reduction in forum shopping by imagina-
tive plaintiffs.
C. Removal
In a case of first impression, J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Conti-
nental Insurance Co.,"2 the district court held that a suit for
breach of a maritime insurance contract was improperly removed
and granted the plaintiff's motion to remand to the Greenville
County Court for adjudication. Ryan had purchased a marine
insurance contract from Continental to cover any losses or dam-
age to its goods while in shipment. When some of Ryan's goods
were damaged during shipment and a claim submitted, Conti-
nental denied coverage. Ryan then brought suit against Conti-
nental in the Greenville County Court seeking recovery of
60. Comment, Miller v. Perry: Further Complications in Determining Diversity
Jurisdiction, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 282, 294 (1973), discusses this possibility. Seemingly
overlooked by the Miller court is another ramification of its decision. If followed, it will
lead to extensive procedural complications, substantially delaying trial by necessitating
an in-depth party examination. The Miller decision, however, will lead to mandatory,
presumably pretrial, party exploration. If in fact one of the primary purposes of the
Federal Rules is to simplify pleading, any complication going at cross-purposes to such
aim would seem to be hard to justify.
61. 456 F.2d at 67.
62. 369 F. Supp. 692 (D.S.C. 1974).
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$6710.31 plus interest and costs for its alleged losses under the
marine insurance contract. Continental then attempted to re-
move the case63 on the ground that the issue was one over which
the district court had original jurisdiction. The issue thus pre-
sented to the court was
[w]hether a maritime claim can be removed from a state court
either to the civil side of the federal district court in the absence
of a federal question and the requisite jurisdictional amount in
a diversity situation or to the admiralty side of the federal dis-
trict court in the face of the "savings to suitors" clause."
Since Ryan sought to bring his original cause of action as a
civil action in a state court system under the "savings to suitors"
clause, rather than as an admiralty action in the federal courts,
the district court found that removal was improper and remanded
the case to the state court. The court recognized that the "savings
to suitors" 5 clause was enacted especially to allow the plaintiff,
who has a claim which may be tried as a state civil action or as a
federal admiralty action, to choose his forum. To allow removal
from the civil side of the state court to the admiralty side of the
federal court would deprive the plaintiff of this choice and would
be tantamount to nullifying the "savings to suitors" clause.
The court traced a plaintiff's right to pursue "other remedies
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970) provides:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the
place where such action is pending.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction
founded on a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of
the United States shall be removable without regard to the citizenship or resi-
dence of the parties. Any other such action shall be removable only if none of
the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of
the State in which such action is brought.
A contract for maritime insurance is a contract within the jurisdiction of the federal
district court. See New England Mut. Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1
(1870).
64. 369 F. Supp. at 694.
65. The "savings to suitors" clause is included in 28 U.S.C. § 1333 (1970) (emphasis
added):
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction exclusive of the courts of the
states of:
(1) Any civil case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, saving to suitors
in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.
[Vol. 27
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to which they are otherwise entitled""6 from the common law.
This right was created in the midst of a power struggle between
British maritime courts and their common law counterparts
which culminated in legislation restricting the traditional juris-
diction of British admiralty courts and expanding the common
law jurisdiction to fill the corresponding void. 7 The court rea-
soned that
[i]t is probable that the First Congress, cognizant of these de-
velopments, intended to preserve these common law remedies
that were then available in Britain for matters within the histor-
ical admiralty jurisdiction without narrowing the admiralty ju-
risdiction of the newly formed United States. If this is so, one
electing to pursue "a remedy to which he is otherwise entitled"
is in all probability proceeding pursuant to a right - or cause
of action - created by the common law."8
The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Romero
v. International Terminal Operating Co. 9 and its analysis of the
policies underlying the maritime cause of action as reflected by
the "savings to suitors" clause. The Supreme Court, in Romero,
emphasized that the maritime suitor has possessed the historical
option to pursue his cause of action in the forum of his choice and
that
[b]y making maritime cases removable to the federal courts it
would make considerable inroads into the traditionally exer-
cised concurrent jurisdiction of the state courts in admiralty
matters - a jurisdiction which it was the unquestioned aim of
the saving clause of 1789 to preserve."
This reasoning is reinforced by the wording of the original "sav-
ings to suitors" clause in the Judiciary Act of 1789 which provided
that "[t]he district court shall have exclusive cognizance of all
civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction saving to suit-
ors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy where the
common law is competent to give it. ' '71 From the language of this
66. Id.
67. See 7A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE .200[2].
68. 369 F. Supp. at 696-97.
69. 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
70. Id. at 371-72.
71. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 76-77, Chapters 20, 29. This was amended in 1952.
See note 65 supra. The reason for changing the wording is somewhat nebulous. In the
Reviser's Note to the new Title 28, the explanation offered for the change is that it is
1975]
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precursor of the modern "savings to suitors" clause, it would seem
clear that the clause "must have been intended to provide that
some portion of the category of 'civil causes of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction' could be tried in courts other than the
United States district courts."" It 'is also well settled that the
person who originated the suit is the beneficiary of the savings
clause. As Justice Wayne stated in Waring v. Clarke:73
The saving is for the benefit of suitors, plaintiff and defendant,
when the plaintiff in a case of concurrent jurisdiction chooses to
sue in the common law courts. It certainly could not have been
intended more for the benefit of the defendant than for the
plaintiff, which would be the case if he could at his will force
the plaintiff into a common law court, and in that way release
himself and his property from all the responsibilities which a
court of admiralty can impose."
Certainly, the converse is true and the court should not allow a
defendant to utilize removal procedure to deprive the plaintiff of
his historical choice of forum.
The Ryan court discerned another possible loss to the plain-
tiff if removal were allowed. In the absence of a federal question
or the requisite amount in controversy, the court reasoned that
it would gain jurisdiction solely because of the maritime nature
of the claim. Upon removal, if removable at all, the suit must be
treated as an admiralty action. 5 Consequently, Ryan would lose
its right to a jury trial because the admiralty side of the federal
court traditionally sits without a jury. Ryan's right to obtain some
forms of equitable relief would also be limited and certain civil
remedies which are not a part of the maritime law would not be
available to him. Additionally, the court reasoned that since the
"simpler and more expressive of the original intent of Congress and is in conformity with
Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolishing the distinction between law and
equity." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (1970), Reviser's Note.
72, D. ROBERTSON, ADMIRALTY AND FEDERAusM 123 (1970).
73. 46 U.S. (5 Harv.) 441 (1847).
74. Id. at 461.
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(h) provides in part:
Admiralty and Maritime Claims. A pleading or count setting forth a claim for
relief within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction that is also within the
jurisdiction of the district court on some other ground may contain a statement
identifying the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim for the purposes of
Rules 14(c), 38(e), 82, and the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and
Maritime Claims. If the claim is cognizable only in admiralty, it is an admiralty
or maritime claim for those purposes whether so identified or not.
[Vol. 27
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cause of action, as commenced in the state court, was cast as a
civil action and not as an admiralty cause of action, it therefore
should not be removable so as to change the very posture of the
plaintiffs case. The Ryan court stated that, in this instance, the
plaintiffs choice of forum was a
common law right, enforceable only in a civil law court, is not
now, and never was, a part of the admiralty jurisdiction within
the exclusive grant of admiralty jurisdiction in § 1333. To this
background courts now must add the settled law that (1) the
jurisdiction of federal courts on removal is derivative. . . and
(2) the fact that the removed action must have been one that
could originally have been brought in the federal district court.
The above reasoning indicates that the instant case cannot, as
it must, fulfill both these tests."
To allow plaintiffs to be deprived of their right to choose their
forum could result in great harm to the plaintiff and to both the
state and federal court systems. If such removal were allowed,
every case with a possible admiralty basis could be removed to
the federal district court if the defendant so desired. Such re-
moval could effectively eliminate state courts from exercising any
concurrent jurisdiction over minor civil claims based on possible
maritime causes of action, and place added pressure on an al-
ready crowded federal calendar.
D. Amount in Controversy
Cast-A-Stone Products of South Carolina, Inc. v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.77 involved a contract between the plaintiff
and defendant which provided that in the event of a suit on the
contract, the losing party would pay to the winning party a rea-
sonable amount for attorney's fees." Although only $9600 was due
on the contract at the commencement of suit, the plaintiff alleged
that $980 in extras plus a reasonable attorney's fee under the
contract terms would satisfy the requirement of a $10,000 juris-
dictional amount.79 After showing to the court's satisfaction that
76. 369 F. Supp. at 697.
77. 379 F. Supp. 929 (D.S.C. 1974).
78. The court felt that a reasonable attorney's fee in contract cases would be at least
10 percent of the amount involved in the litigation. If the entire $9,600 were recovered,
then that would amount to $960 in fees and exceed the jurisdictional minimum.
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1970) provides: "The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value
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the $980 in extras had been paid to the plaintiff after the comm-
encement of the suit, the defendant moved that the complaint be
dismissed for want of the required jurisdictional amount in con-
troversy.
The court held that the unliquidated attorney's fee which the
plaintiff sought could be considered as part of the "amount in
controversy" and, therefore, the complaint satisfied the $10,000
minimum. Although these fees are not "costs" or "interest"
which must be excluded under the statutory requirements, the
court reasoned that a complaint should not be dismissed for want
of jurisdictional amount "unless it appears to a legal certainty
that plaintiff cannot recover an amount equal to or exceeding the
statutory requirement.""0 Since the plaintiff sued for $9600 plus
the lawyer's fee, the court found that "it does not appear to a legal
certainty that plaintiff cannot recover an amount in excess of
$10,000.00."l This determination appears correct. Using the
court's analysis, attorney's fees can be accurately assessed prior
to commencement of the suit.82 If plaintiff were sucessful in the
prosecution of its claim, it would be entitled to an amount in
excess of the jurisdictional limit. The defendant was afforded
adequate protection by the fact that it could impose court costs
on the plaintiff upon plaintiff's failure to recover the requisite
amount. Consequently, there appears little to distinguish this
case from the multitude of other cases litigated in federal courts
where the damage alleged slightly exceeds the statutory jurisdic-
tional amount.
The South Carolina Supreme Court, over a strong dissent by
Justices Littlejohn and Moss, held in Wadsworth Industries, Inc.
v. Westgate Knitting, Inc. 0 that the Spartanburg County Court
exceeded its jurisdictional limit under section 15-804 of the South
Carolina Code, which provides:
The county court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the
court of common pleas in all civil cases and special proceedings,
both at law and equity, except that its jurisdiction shall not
of $10,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs and is between ...citizens of different
states. .. ."
80. 379 F. Supp. at 932.
81. Id. at 933 (emphasis added). See note 78 supra.
82. See note 78 supra.
83. 22 Smith's Advance Reports 5 (S.C. 1974). Due to reversal upon rehearing, this
opinion was never published elsewhere.
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extend to actions at law for the recovery of money when the
amount demanded in the complaint exceeds $25,000.00, or for
the recovery of specific real or personal property when the value
of such property exceeds $25,000.00.84
The majority reasoned that the jurisdiction of the county courts
is confined by the limits promulgated by the Legislature and that
the Spartanburg County Court could not assume any powers not
specifically granted by legislative enactment. Because
Wadsworth involved administration of the receivership of West-
gate which involved cash and property greatly in excess of
$25,000, the court ruled that the county court was without juris-
diction of the subject matter in dispute and reversed the judg-
ment of the lower court.
The majority apparently reasoned that the Legislature had
set a $25,000 limit on both actions at law and equity, despite the
omission of qualifying language. The statute in question clearly
does not mention equitable actions under the monetary limita-
tion clause. The dissent seized on the omission of these words to
argue that the Spartanburg County Court possesses general juris-
diction in all equity matters concurrent with that of the court of
common pleas. Since there are no constitutional limitations on
the civil jurisdiction which the General Assembly can confer on
the county courts, the Legislature has the power to confer unlim-
ited civil jurisdiction on the county court if it chooses to do so.
Reading the statute in its most literal sense, the dissent felt that
the General Assembly chose to limit the civil jurisdiction of the
Spartanburg County Court only in actions at law. Consequently,
the Spartanburg County Court possessed concurrent jurisdiction
with the courts of common pleas in equity actions. Since the
administration of a receivership is purely an equity matter,8 the
jurisdiction of the Spartanburg County Court was clear.
The majority opinion gains some weight when viewed in light
of the proposed district court statute." The proposed district
court system, which is to replace the current system of county
courts, grants "exclusive civil jurisdiction in those cases involving
twenty-five thousand dollars or less" to the district court.8" Since
84. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-804 (1962), as amended by No. 1134, [1970] S.C. Acts &
Jt. Res. 2487.
85. See Pelzer, Rodgers & Co. v. Hughes, 27 S.C. 408, 3 S.E. 781 (1887).
86. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO MAKE A STUDY OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA JUDICIAL
SYsTEM, Recommendation No. 5, (March 1974) at 8.
87. Id.
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the proposed district courts are "courts of limited jurisdiction,""8
as are the county courts, and the committee retained the $25,000
limitation in all civil matters, the majority view that the Legisla-
ture intended the current limitation to apply to actions at law
and equity is bolstered. It would also seem inconsistent to distin-
guish between actions at law and actions in equity when one is
conferring jurisdiction on the same court. The dissent's view,
however, is the more acceptable one if the statute is to be read
in its most literal sense. Moreover, concurrent jurisdiction be-
tween the county courts and the courts of common pleas in equity
matters would act to relieve the congestion of court calendars in
the more populous counties until such time as the district court
system becomes the law. In a reconsideration of its decision, 9 the
majority recently withdrew its opinion in Wadsworth and allowed
the dissent's view to stand. At the present time, the Spartanburg
County Court possesses an unlimited equity jurisdiction concur-
rent with that of the courts of common pleas.
II. MISCELLANEOUS
In Rockland Industries v. Interior Designers, Inc., of South
Carolina,9" the court held that an affidavit appended to a state-
ment of account which was attached to a complaint could not
serve to verify the complaint. The plaintiff had served his com-
plaint without a verification, but with the affidavit and state-
ment of account. The defendant answered with a general denial
of the allegations of the complaint which was also unverified. The
trial court granted the plaintiffs motion to strike the answer as
"sham and frivilous" and the defendant appealed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court recognized that the affi-
davit was appended to the statement of account in accordance
with section 10-1531 of the South Carolina Code and was
permitted solely for evidentiary purposes in default cases and
forms no part of the pleadings....
The form of the verification of a complaint is set forth in
Section 10-604, and there is nothing to indicate that the affida-
vit permitted by Section 10-1531, for purely evidentiary pur-
poses, was intended to take the place of such verification. In
88. Id.
89. 264 S.C. 106, 212 S.E.2d 571 (1975).
90. 263 S.C. 338, 210 S.E.2d 468 (1974).
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order to verify a compaint, the allegations thereof must be veri-
fied in the manner required by Section 10-604. In no other way
can the practitioner know with certainty whether to treat the
prior pleading as verified."
Since the plaintiffs affidavit was not intended as, nor did it meet
the requirements of, a verification, the court reversed the lower
court judgment and allowed the general denial to stand.
In McGinnis Lumber Co. v. Belser,92 the court denied the
defendant's motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to the
Bankruptcy Act, which provides that
[p]rior to the approval of a petition, the judge may upon cause
shown grant a temporary stay, until the petition is approved or
dismissed, of a prior pending bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure
or equity receivership proceeding and of any act or other pro-
ceeding to enforce a lien against a debtor's property, and may
upon cause shown enjoin or stay until the petition is approved
or dismissed the commencement or continuation of a suit
against a debtor.3
The defendants were accommodation makers on a note and guar-
antors on an open account between the lumber company and
Geneva Corporation, a builder. Geneva subsequently filed for
bankruptcy and the plaintiff sought to collect from the
defendants. The defendants admitted their liability on the note
and the open account but sought to stay the proceedings in ac-
cordance with the Bankruptcy Act. They contended that since
the liability of the principal could not be determined until the
reorganization of Geneva was competed, the court should grant
a stay of the instant suit until such time.
The court found that the defendants, accommodation mak-
ers and guarantors on an open account, could not come within the
protection of the Bankruptcy Act94 and their motion, therefore,
was dismissed. The court reasoned that the first part of the stat-
ute related to proceedings "against a debtor's property" and the
second part to a "suit against a debtor." As the court pointed out,
a "debtor" under the Bankruptcy Act is "a corporation by or
91. Id. at 341-42, 210 S.E.2d at 469. See Morgan's, Inc. v. Surinam Lumber Corp.,
251 S.C. 61, 160 S.E.2d 191 (1968).
92. 385 F. Supp. 390 (D.S.C. 1974).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 513 (1970) (emphasis added).
94. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
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which a petition has been filed under this chapter. . . ."I' Since
the defendants were individuals, they could not come within the
Act. The court also found the suit to be against the individual
monies of the defendants and therefore not within the definition
of proceedings "against a debtor's property." For these reasons
the court felt it lacked the power to stay the proceedings against
the defendants and granted the plaintiffs motion for judgment
on the pleadings pursuant to rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure."
95. 385 F. Supp. at 395; see 11 U.S.C. § 506(5) (1970).
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (1970) provides:
After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any
party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not ex-
cluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment
and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable
opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such i motion by Rule
56.
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